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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

a.

Plaintiffs/Appellants: Kelly Smith and Lisa Nielsen, (individually
and as heirs of Jason Kelly Smith, deceased).

b.

Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff/Appellee: Hales & Warner
Construction, Inc.

c.

Defendant/Appellee: Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (hereafter the CPB).

d.

Third Party Defendant: Brent Reynolds Construction, Inc.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 24(a)(4), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure; the Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)0*).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether an owner of real property is entitled to summary judgment where
the employee of a sub-subcontractor is personally injured during the construction
of a building on the owner's property, and it is undisputed that (1) the owner
retained a general contractor to construct the building, (2) the owner did npt retain
control over the manner, methods, operative details or particulars of performance
of (a) the construction in general, (b) the general type of work being performed at
the time of injury, or (c) the specific activities which caused the injury; and (3)
the owner did not exercise supervision or control over the manner, methods,
operative details or particulars of performance of (a) the general type of work
being performed at the time of injury, or (b) the specific activities which caused
the injury.
Whether the owner of real property may be held liable, under the retained
control doctrine of Thompson v. Jess, 1999 Utah 22, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999),
for injury to an employee of a sub-subcontractor assisting on construction of a
building on the owner's property, where the owner only retained control over the
finished product, that is, sufficient control to ensure conformity with the plans and
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specifications, but did not exercise supervision or control over the manner,
methods, operative details or particulars of performance of the work.
Whether an owner of real property, who contracts with a general contractor
to build a building on the owner's property, may be held liable for work-place
injuries even if the court should find that the owner retained some degree of
general control contractually, but the owner is passive and does not exercise actual
control over the manner, methods, operative details or particulars of the
performance of the specific injury-causing work, or that type of work generally.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(General facts)
1.

The Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus

Christ of Latter Day Saints (hereafter the CPB) owned property in Highland, Utah,
on which a chapel for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints was to be
built (hereafter referred to as the Property).
2.

On or about May 7, 1999, this Appellee, as "owner" of the Property

entered into a construction contract with Appellee Hales & Warner Construction,
Inc. (hereafter the Contractor), a general contractor, for the construction of the
chapel on the Property. R. at 273.
3.

The Contract consisted of an agreement, general conditions, and

other documents (hereafter collectively the Contract). R. at 273, entitled "the
Contract Documents," which provides that the general conditions, the agreement
and other documents "form the contract" between the parties.
4

4.

The Appellants' decedent was fatally injured while raising a pre-

fabricated wall or wall frame, when the wall began to tip, falling on top of the
decedent. R. at 8.
(Facts Regarding Lack of Retention of Control Over the Manner, Methods,
Operational Details or Particulars of the Construction in General)
5.

Under the Contract, the Contractor had sole and exclusive

responsibility and control over the manner, methods and particulars of the work.
Paragraphs 6-17, below.
6.

Under the Contract, this Appellee, the CPB, is the "Owner" and the

co-Appellee Hales & Warner Construction, Inc. is the "Contractor." R. at 273.
7.

Article I of the Contract provides that the Contractor will furnish all

materials and perform all labor: "Contractor shall furnish all of the materials and
equipment and perform all of the labor necessary to complete all of the work as
required in the contract documents entitled Highland 4, 20 wards;". R. at 273,
Article I, Exhibit A at page 1.
8.

Under the general conditions of the Contract, the Contractor is solely

responsible for all of the particulars of the work:
"3.2 SUPERVISION OF CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES
A.

The Contractor shall supervise and direct the Work using the
best skill and attention. The Contractor shall be solely
responsible for all construction means, methods, techniques,
sequences, and procedures and for coordinating all portion of
the Work."

R. at 266, paragraph 3.2, at page 3 of 12. (Emphasis added).
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9.

The general conditions further provide:

"3.3 LABOR AND MATERIALS
C.

The Contractor is fully responsible for the Project and al]
materials and work connected therewith until the Owner has
accepted this Work in writing."

R. at 266, paragraph 3.3, C , page 3 of 12. (Emphasis added). See para. 13,
below, regarding acceptance of the work when all work is completed.
10.

The general conditions further provide:

"3.3

LABOR AND MATERIALS
A.

Unless otherwise provided in the Contract Documents, the
Contractor shall provide and pay for all labor, materials,
equipment, tools, water, heat, utilities, transportation, and
other facilities and services necessary for the proper
execution and completion of the Work."

R. at 266, paragraph 3.3, A., page 3 of 12. (Emphasis added).
11.

The general conditions further provide:
"3.7 CONTRACTOR'S ON SITE REPRESENTATIVE

The Contractor shall employ a competent representative to supervise the
performance of the Work."
Re at 266, paragraph 3.7, page 3 of 12. (Emphasis added).
12.

The general conditions also state:

"1.2 EXECUTION, CORRELATION, AND INTENT
1.

The intent of the Contract Documents is to include all labor,
material, equipment and other items necessary for the proper
execution and completion of the Work."

R. at 267, paragraph 1.2, B. (Emphasis added).
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13.

Under the Contract, Article IX:
"The Work shall only be inspected for acceptance upon notice
from the Contractor and Architect that all work is complete:
[the Work shall be inspected for acceptance by Owner
promptly upon receipt of notice from Contractor and
Architect, that all work is complete and ready for inspection.
The building and all materials and work connected therewith
shall be a Contractor's risk until accepted by Owner in
writing."

R. at 272, Article IX, page 2. (Emphasis added).
14.

The Contract provides that between the Owner and the general

Contractor, shall be another independent Contractor, the Architect. R. at 264,
Exhibit B, Section 4, page 5 of 12. The general conditions provide that
"communication between the Contractor and the Owner, relating to the Work,
shall be through the Architect." R. at 264, Section 4.2, C , page 5 of 12.
15.

The role of the Architect, as intermediary between the Owner and

the general Contractor, is only to monitor progress and quality of the work
generally, not to control the particulars of the work or safety; the Architect will
only become "generally" familiar with the progress and quality of the work. For
example, the general conditions provide the following:
"B.

The Architect will make frequent visits to the site to
familiarize itself, generally, with the progress and quality of
the Work, and to determine if the Work is proceeding in
accordance with the Contract Documents. . . Although the
Architect is required to make periodic inspections, it is not
required to make exhaustive or continuous on-site inspection.
On the basis of its observations while at the site, the Architect
will keep the Owner informed of the progress of the Work
and will endeavor to guard the Owner against defects and
deficiencies in the Work."
7

R. at 264, paragraph 4.2, B., page 5 of 12. (Emphasis added).
16.

Further indicating even the Architect's lack of control over the

details of the work, the following is illustrative:
"4.2. G.
. . . The Architect's review of the submittals shall be for the limited
purpose of checking for general conformance with the
Contract Documents and shall not be conducted for the
purpose of determining the accuracy and completeness of
details such as dimensions and quantities or for substantiating
instruction for installation or performance of equipment or
systems, all of which remain the responsibility of the
Contractor."
R. at 264, paragraph 4.2, G., page 5 of 12. (Emphasis added).
17.

The Contractor remains responsible, not only for its own work, but

for the work of all subcontractors. The general conditions provide:
"5.2 SUBCONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
A.

The Contractor's responsibility of the Work includes
the work and materials of all Subcontractors including
those recommended or approved by the Owner. The
Contractor shall be responsible to the Owner for
proper completion and guarantee of all workmanship
and materials under any subcontract."

R. at 264, paragraph 5.2, A., page 5 of 12.
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(Facts Relating to Lack of Actual Exercise of Control Over the Manner, Methods,
Operative Detail or Particulars of Performance of the Specific Activities Which
Caused the Injury, or Such Activities in General)
18.

The CPB, as owner of the ground and building being constructed,

did not control the particulars of the specific activities which caused the death at
issue.
19.

The only representative of the CPB associated with the project was

Dean Schick. R. at 895, Schick depo. at 49-50.
20.

Mr. Schick only visited the project once every two or three weeks.

R. at 897 and 894, Schick depo. at 33, 56.
21.

Mr. Schick's visits were only to ensure that the building would be

built according to plans and specifications R. at 900-899, Schick depo. at 24-27.
22.

Mr. Schick was not even in the state of Utah at the time the wall was

being erected which resulted in the death; he was on vacation at the time. R. at
896, Schick depo. at 40.
23.

Concerning the lack of control over particulars of the work, Mr.

Schick testified:
"Q. Okay. Did you oversee or control or interfere with the day-today details, methods, manner or techniques that were used by
the subcontractors"
A. No.
Q. Did you oversees, control or interfere with the safety of the
workers on the job site?
A. No."
R. at 894-893, Schick depo. at 56:21 to 57:2.

9

(The Findings of the Lower Court That the CPB Neither
Retained nor Exercised Control)
24.

The District Court in its order of summary judgment found the

following:
a.

"The CPB did not hire, train, or educate Jason Smith

[appellants5 decedent], Michael Lewis, or Jose Louis [the decedent's co-workers]
as to the work they were performing at the time of the accident." R. at 1040.
b.

The decedent "Jason Smith was an employee of Egbert

Construction prior to and at the time of the accident." R. at 1040.
c.

". . . [J]ason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis were

under the direction, supervision, instruction and control of Egbert Construction at
the time of the accident. R. at 1040.
d.

"[T]he evidence indicates that it was Egbert Construction

who was controlling the means utilized and the manner of performance of the
work being performed by Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis at the time
of the accident R. at 1039.
e.

". . . Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis were n_qt

under the direction, supervision, instruction or control of. . . the CPB prior to and
at the time of the accident." R. at 1040. (Emphasis added).
f.

There was "no evidence that Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and

Jose Louis were under the direction, supervision, construction or control of. . . the
CPB. R. at 1040. (Emphasis added).
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g.

". . . [Tjhcre is no evidence ilia! . . . the CPB instructed Egbert

Construction t»r u.s employees (or BK( 01 iu employees) to do the work being
}• *r(orniee

*'

•

a

different method." R. at
h.

". . . rT]here is no evidence that. . . the CPB exerted control

over the means utilized b . .a:;; ;

.u ; ...

\is.v- v. -.iti-. Michael Lewi^> or Jo^e Louis wcie performing at the time oi the

A

accident, or that. . . the CPB interfered with that work." R j it 1040-1030.
(Emphasis added)
1.

C(

:

-.

.

,

:

.••• ,

^ m v s e n t a i h : / of-he CPB

on the site at the time of the Accident and no employee or representative of the
CPB had any involvement in the work being performed by Jason Smith, Michael
]

•

,.

•

v

>

SUMMARY OF THE A R G I [1 1ENTS
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly established that in order for a general
contractor, let aloi le ai I o"\ v nei ot pi opei t:> , to be liable foi \ ' 'oi k place n i jiii ies at a
construction site, the general contractor must have actively participated in
controlling, determining, or interfering with, the manner, methods, operative
GeiaiLs o i [JL.'.iJUi.:!.^-: j ' ^ i . ' :

.'*• - [ ^ •

•*

'.

:*

]f ;.i POIIIT;.' ontractor, and even less an owner, does not so interfere, there is no
duty and no liability.
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Retention of control over the general result of work to be performed, such
as the ability to ensure that the building conforms to plans and specifications is
insufficient to create a duty on the part of the general contractor, let alone on an
owner, with respect to construction site injuries. The Utah Supreme Court has
stated that "passive non-participation" is insufficient to result in liability even if
control is retained by contract.
The general contractor engaged by this Appellee was an independent
contractor because it was engaged for a specific project and it controlled how it
would complete the project. Vicarious liability does not apply to make an owner
liable for injuries to an employee of a sub subcontractor on a work site even if
those injuries are caused by the general contractor, which, in this case, they were
not.
There is no evidence that the CPB exercised any control over the manner,
methods, operative details or particulars of performance of any of the following:
(1) the injury causing aspects of the work, (2) the type of work generally being
performed at the time of the injury, (3) any of the work on the project at issue
remotely related to the injury, (4) any other aspect of the manner, methods,
operative details or particulars of any work. There is simply no dispute of material
fact in that regard, and Appellants have called this court's attention to nothing to
the contrary.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN U\\ .\m< ul : REAL niuPHRTY WHO CONTRACTS
WITH A CONTRACTOR TO CONSTRUCT A BUILDING
ON THE OWNER'S PROPERTY, IS NOT LIABLE FOR
WORK-PLACE INJURIES TO EMPLOYEES OF SUBSUBCONTRACTORS WHERE THE OWNER DOES NOT
RETAIN OR EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE
MANNER, METHODS, OPERATIVE DETAILS OR
PARTICULARS OF PERFORMANCE OF THE SPECI1 k
ACTIVITIES WHICH CAUSED THE INJURY, OR EV EN
OVER THE GENERAL TYPE OF WORK BEING
PERFORMED AT THE TIME.
The general rule, in Utah and elsewhere, recognizes that an owner of
property
]

'

.• engages a:. ;,.;e, . ••> •

i

•.••-.' 'ic manner, methods, operative details or particulars by which the

contractor's work is performed, owes no duty of care to employees of the
contractor or subcontractors on ii.v. ,»,. t;;;„ ;na\ IK>: no :\ci.. name . .!..: .

•

1 ''•,;' "nipl- «> res I'nr M ny[ place i"|"! ic
In Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999), the Supreme Court
affirmed summary judgment in favor of ilk landowner when a worker at a
( .mslruelMii id.'I. ,1 lir- leu as a M'sull 'I ,i -OIIS'IIII lion n I lied ni|iii \ In
affirming the lower court's grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court
recognized that landowners are generally not n,ti>k ior injuries caused during
v niislnii Imii nil iln M I,mil SiiiiiKii In lln i ,isc ,il is-.m III lln'iii(^i n llii worker
was erecting a large vertical pipe for a sign when he lost control of it and it hit his
leg resulting in lite leg's amputation. The Court stated:
13

Utah adheres to the general common law rule that "the
employer of an independent contractor is not liable for
physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the
contractor or his servants." Restatement § 409; see Gleason
v. Salt Lake City, 94 Utah 1, 16, 74 P.2d 1225, 1232 (1937).
Id. at [PI3] (Emphasis added). The Court continued:
This general rule recognizes that one who hires an
independent contractor and does not participate in or control
the manner in which the contractor's work is performed owes
no duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or
method of performance implemented. See W. Prosser & W.
Keaton, the Law of Torts 509 (5th ed. 1984).
Id. (Emphasis added). The Court stated the reason for the rule:
The most commonly accepted reason for this rule is that,
where the principal employer does not control the means of
accomplishing the contracted work, the contractor "is the
proper party to be charged with the responsibility for
preventing the risk [arising out of the work], and
administering and distributing it."
Id. quoting W. Prosser and W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 509 (5th ed. 1984).
(Emphasis added).
There are exceptions to this rule when an employer of an independent
contractor exercises sufficient control over or interferes with the work which gives
rise to a limited duty of care, but not enough control to become an employer or
master of those over whom the control is asserted. This is called the "retained
control" doctrine. See Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d at 326 [P14].
In Thompson, the Supreme Court devoted one subsection of the case,
subsection A., to the "retainedcontrol" doctrine. See Thompson, at 326-328. As
set out in Appellants' brief, the court discussed four federal court cases applying
14

Utah law, then adopted the standards set out in those cases as Utah law.
Concerning those cases, the Supreme Court stated:
" rhose courts uniformly have determined that under Day um.
a principal employer is not subject to liability for injuries
arising out of its contractor's work unless the employer
'actively participates' in the performance of the work.
Id. at 327 [PI8]. (Emphasis added). The Court then continued:
"For instance, in Simon v. Deery Oil, 299 F. Supp. 2:* \ 2?8
(D. Utah 1988) the court cited Dayton for the proposition
that a principal employer 'retaining an independent
contractor to render services has no duty to warn or train
employees of the contractor, nor must the principal protect
the contractor's employees from the contractor's own
negligence, unless .the principal has 'actively participated'
in the project'. See also Sewell v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
606 F.2d 274, 276 (10th Cir. 1979), . . . Texaco, Inc. v.
Pruitt, 396 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir. 1968); Erwin v. Kern
River Gas Transmission Co., 1997 TEX. App. LEXIS 6685,
(addressing Utah law on issue).
hi at

J^!()-JJ

•: .'

.mphasis aaaea;

,^..;

*.cn -p., inui..

A I/;

^

\iz

"We believe the standard relied upon in these cases is correct,
and we formally adopt the same."
i < i at 32 7 [I "IS].
Not only was the "active participation" standard adopted by the Court, but
the Court went on to elaborate thereon, stating: "elaboration on the contours of the
standard is needL-d. howeve*
( »^' < >? -vu*

'

-

*

r> ..tm-e

A cut-

.nn*

-\i ;taiidard as adopted, that elaboration became

part of the standard, unlike Appellants' argument that the elaboration was mere
superfluous guidance or dicta.
In elaborating on the contours of the standard, the Court held that under the
"active participation" standard a principal employer is not liable for injuries in the
work-place to an employee of an independent contractor, unless the employer, "is
actively involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of performance of the
contracted work." Id. at 327 [PI9]. In further elaborating, the Court cited the
Restatement of Torts § 414 that the active participation must be with respect to the
specific Activities or equipment which causes theTnjury:
"The degree of control necessary for the creation of a legal duty
must involve either the direct management of the means and
methods of the independent contractor's activities or the provision of
the specific equipment that caused the injury"
Id. at 327 [P20] (Emphasis added).
The Supreme Court gave examples, illustrating the fact that the interference
by the general contractor must be with respect to the methods of work causing the
injury. For example, the court cited Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc., 170
Ariz. 384, 825 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Ariz. 1992) stating about that case that it involves
"imposing liability where a subcontractor's employee was injured as a result of
new, less safe methods of work required by the general contractor." Id. at 327
[PI9] (Emphasis added). That is, the interference was with the actual work
causing the injury, making that work less safe and thus contributing to the injury.
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The Supreme Court later returned to the example of the Lewis case, above,
stating that, "the requisite level of control over the contractor's work is well
illustrated

Lewis. \w.\\ :;. .;.^ncicn

.

;v^.

w ork as indicate din the pre\ ioi is paragraph. Id. at 327 [P22]. The Court then
recited the facts of Lewis finding that the general contractor's superintendent,
"instructed the Garges [subcontractor's] employees to use a different, faster
mdlbod of dislodging llu1 plv\\ood . , "

J

\l .il V'X [P 11 )

Hit" Coinl then stated

that, "because this method resulted in plywood being dislodged faster than h-clips
could be installed, numerous sheets of plywood were left 1\ ing loose on top of the
K-::.

.

.

*

rarloi • niil, 1 lv li '|,|

liable because, "a worker was injured as a direct result of the dangerous condition
created by the general contractor's method." Id. at 328 [P23] (emphasis added).
The worker had stepped on the loose pi \ wood and luad lalli m
1 hi is \ here a coi lti actoi interferes with or controls the work which causes
the injury, then and only then is the "requisite level of control, "reached for
liability to attach", The same would be true of an owner, such as the CPR
The fact that tl ic activ e pai ticipatioi I i i n ist be ii i the activities which caused
the injuries was further illustrated in Thompson when the Supreme Court applied
the above-mentioned standards to the facts of the Thompson case itseii. : :.c • ~. i
Stilled, "'T|h iiiiniM ii i

i ni 11 mi ni ni

u 'is c a n a r d h \ !ln i i n u i i r r n t ' i n r f n n n a n < V

implemented by Jensen, over which Jess [the general contractor] exercised no
direction, control or supervision." Id. at 328 [P24]. Thus, the general contractor

was found not to have exercised direction, control or supervision over the manner
of performance of the injury-causing aspect of the work, therefore, it could not be
held liable. The Court further demonstrated that control over the injury-causing
aspect of the work is what is critical by stating that, "Jensen alone chose to attempt
installation of the pipe without a backhoe," therefore the general contractor was
not liable. Id. at 328 [P25].
The Court also stated, in discussing the facts of Thompson that the general
contractor, "did not actively participate in or otherwise exercise affirmative
control over the manner or method of performance utilized by . . . the injured
party, so the contractor owed to the injured party, 'no duty of care under the
retained control doctrine."5 Id. at 328 [P26] (Emphasis added).
(Control of the Desired Result on a Construction Project is
Insufficient to Result in a Duty and Liability)
Control generally over the desired result even with regard to the specific
type of work which resulted in the accident is insufficient to result in liability. In
Thompson, the Court found no liability because the control which the general
contractor exerted was merely, "in directing that the pipe be installed over the pipe
stub." Id. at 328 [P22]. The Court held that, "this amounted merely to control
over the desired result, which is insufficient to come within the retained control
doctrine." Id. at 328 [P24] (Emphasis added).
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The Court also quoted from the Restatement of Torts, § 414 again for the
proposition that:
"It is not enough that he [ the employei ] has nleieiy a guncidi
right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its
progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or
recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or
to prescribe alternations and deviations. Such a general right
is usually reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the
contractor is controlled as to his methods of work or as to
operative detail."
L< in ; 2' : M* • •; i Kmnhasis added). The mere retention of such control is
insufficient to create a duty and liability. See also Point II, below.
(Interference with the Manner, Methods, Operative Details or
Particulars of Performance Generally Does Not Result in Liability
Unless that Interference caused the Accident at Issue)
In its brief, Appellants argue that the standard should be that wherever a
general contractor actively participates in certain aspects o! the contracted for
A

is

• * * -•

%

-. * fr*.

, did i lot

result in the injury. See for example, Appellants' brief at 19-20 wherein they state
that, "Appellees became liable under the retained control doctrine if they actively
participated in tl le coi iti acted few „, oi si lbcoi ltracted f c i \ v :>t: 1 ; ,' ' ii I gei leral c\ ei l
though that active participation had no cause and effect relationship on the
accident itself. See also Appellants' brief at 23 wherein they allege that Appellees

process, even if they did not exert control over method or choice to lift the
particular wall thai fell upon am? killed Jason Smith." Appellants" brief at 23. As
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indicated above in this point, the Supreme Court has specifically indicated that the
interference must be with the methods or manner of the work which particularly
caused the injury.
Appellants appear to assert that once the Supreme Court, in Thompson,
adopted the standard set out in the four federal cases mentioned, then that was the
end of the discussion and any "elaboration" which the Supreme Court made
concerning the "contours of the standard", was mere guidance and superfluous
dicta, even though the Supreme Court stated that such elaboration was "needed".
See for example Appellants' statement that the Supreme Court's references to the
Restatement, § 414 are mere guidance. Appellants' brief at 29.
When the Supreme Court says they are necessarily going to elaborate on
the contours of something, then that elaboration is more than mere guidance.
Admittedly, if litigants quote from the Restatement, they may be asking the
Supreme Court to use the Restatement as guidance. Where, however, the Supreme
Court states that it is elaborating on the contours of its own adopted standard, and
cites the Restatement as part of such elaboration, then such elaboration becomes
part of the contours of the standard and is more than mere guidance. Where the
Supreme Court in its elaboration on the contours of the standard quotes the
Restatement that, "the degree of control necessary for the creation of the legal duty
must involve either the direct management of the means and methods of the
independent contractor's activities or the provision of the specific equipment that
caused the injury", Thompson at 327 [P20] (Emphasis added), that elaboration
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establishes the contours of the standard, and is the law in the state of Utah To
state otherwise

io declare :;..., i^ Supreme < - ,./ \.IM \\;;. -u ..

opinions to c :)i ill ise oi e\ ei i decei\ e pei sons in tl le coi isti i iction indi isti ) • potential
litigants, and lawyers relying on its cases. Such a proposition imputes little reason
and sense to the Supreme Court and should be rejected by this Court.
POIN I II
RETAINING CONTROL OVER WORK GENERALLY BY
CONTRACT IS INSUFFICIENT TO CREATE A DUTY OR
ESTABLISH LIABILITY WHERE THE CONTRACT
RIGHTS ARE NOT IN FACT EXERCISED OVER THE
WOPK PF9T TT TINr, TN THF TNJIJRY.
In
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>ne issue with respect to the CPB. it is

as follows:
"whether a principal employer is subject to liability . . . under
'retained control doctrine' by virtue of the existence of a
contract in which the principal employer retained sufficient
control over the manner or method of work, without respect
to whether such control rights were in fact exercised.
Appellants' brief at 5-6. (Emphasis added). .
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retained control over the construction and particulars of the work such that it was
not insulated from liability." Appellants' brief at 39.
The SiipieiiH' < '
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doctrine in Thompson recognized that the term "retained control." "is somewhat of
a misnomer." Id at 32S IP26] n.3. The Court weni on to describe why "retained
control" is a misnomer, stating mai.

icuuna:
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passivity or non-action, is inapt." Id. Elsewhere the court stated very clearly that,
"no duty arises from 'passive, non-participation"\ Id. at 327 [P19], discussing the
case of Conklin v. Colin, 287 So. 2nd 56, 60 (Fla. 1973).
The Court in Thompson discussed the retained control doctrine as stated in
the Restatement of Torts:
§ 414. NEGLIGENT IN EXERCISING CONTROL RETAINED BY
EMPLOYER
One who entrusted work to an independent contractor, but
who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to
liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the
employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is
caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable
care.
Id. at 326 [P 16], citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965) (Emphasis
added). Thus it is not the passive retention of control which creates the duty,
contrary to Appellants' position against the CPB, but the exercise of that retained
control negligently which results in possible liability. The Court stated that it has
not formerly adopted rule 414, but adopted the equivalent doctrine described in
Point I, above, that is, active participation. Thus, the sole issue in this case,
described by Appellants as relating to the CPB, that is, whether an owner is liable
"without respect to whether such contractual rights were in fact exercised,"
(Appellants' brief at 5-6) must be answered in favor of Appellee, and the judgment
below should be affirmed.
Even if, somehow, an owner could be held liable where some form of
control is retained "without respect to whether such contractual rights were in fact
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exercised," the CPB did not even retain control over the manner or methods of the
work performed, but only retained the right to insure that the construction of all
parts of the building as completed, conformed to the plans and specifications as to
size, location, quality of construction, etc. See Facts, above, paragraphs 5-23.
See also Point IV, below.
At pages 39 through 45 of their brief, Appellants characterize parts of the
contract between the CPB and the general contractor, Hales & Warner
Construction, trying to establish that even though contractual rights may not have
been exercised over the work which resulted in the injury, the CPB retained,
generally, sufficient control over the project to make the CPB liable for the actions
of the sub-subcontractor and its employees in raising a pre-fabricated wall. The
following paragraphs, beginning with letters of the alphabet, correspond to the
same letters of the alphabet used by the Appellants at pages 39 through 43, and
respond to those corresponding paragraphs.
a. The CPB established the property lines and benchmarks for grading.
The owner was responsible for the general layout of the building on the ground
with respect to property lines and benchmarks for grades. Such is not the type of
"retained control" over the particulars of manner and methods of work which
would result in liability to the owner for injuries caused during raising of a wall.
b. The CPB has furnished information or services it was required to furnish
to avoid delay in the orderly progress of the work. Liability does not result just
because the owner agrees to provide information timely such as color of desired
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wall coverings, color of paint, or other information, or provide services it ought to
provide such as ordering its own pews and carpet. See para. 1. below, and see
Exhibit 1 to Appellants' brief, page 28 to Plaintiffs deposition where Mr. Schick
of the CPB states that, " . . . [T]he pews and the carpet we order,. . ." The
providing of information by the owner and furnishing of services where the owner
may order some parts such as carpets and pews, does not mean that the owner
interfered with the manner, methods or particulars of the job to the extent that
liability should result for injuries while raising a wall.
c. The owner retained the right to inspect the property at any time. It is the
owner's property and the owner has an interest in insuring that the building
conforms to plans and specifications. It is not improper for an owner to retain
such a right, and such a right does not subject an owner to liability. An owner
should be able, for example, to insure that rooms are placed at the proper
locations, windows or doors are located correctly, wall covering was of the proper
type, etc., without being exposed to work-place injury liability. Merely because an
owner has an interest in the progress of the building, and an interest that the
building is completed according to plans, should not subject the owner to liability.
d. CPB's architect inspected the work. The architect inspected for general
conformity of finished parts to the plans and specifications. See FACTS, above,
paras 15-16. That should not expose an owner of property to liability for workplace injuries, or the negligence of others.
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e. Dean Schick of the CPB inspected the work approximately once every
two to three weeks. See paragraph c , above.
f. The owner allegedly can stop work at any time. Appellants'
characterization here is not quite correct. The reference by Appellants is to
paragraph 2.3 of the contract which states, "if the Contractor fails to carry out the
Work in accordance with the Contract Documents or fails to correct Work which
is not in accordance with Contract Documents in a timely manner the Owner may
order the Contractor in writing to stop the work . . .". R. at 267. If the Contractor's
work is not in conformity with the plans and specifications, the mere fact that an
owner can stop the work and require conformity is not equivalent to controlling
the manner, methods or particulars of how the work is performed, but only the end
product. For example, if plans and specifications call for red brick and contractor
starts using yellow or pink, the owner should have a right to inspect the property,
stop work, and demand that the project conform to the plans and specifications.
Such a right does not interfere with the manner in which the work is performed
which could cause injury, such as how the scaffolding is put up for the brick work,
or the way hod carriers carry their heavy loads, etc. The right to stop the work if
the contractor is not conforming to plans and specifications should not result in
liability to the owner for the negligent actions of others.
g. The owner and architect had access to the work. Paragraph 3.12 of the
contract states that, "the Contractors shall provide the Owner and the Architect
access to the work wherever located." Again, the right of an owner to be able to
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inspect the finished parts of the work for conformity to plans and specifications
does not mean that the owner is interfering with the manner and means of the
methods by which such parts are actually constructed. See para, c, above.
h. The contractor, architect and/or the engineer has the right to condemn
and require removal of work which does not conform to the contract documents.
That should be a right without exposing an owner to liability for work-place
injuries during construction of the non-conforming work.
i. The architect can stop work. Here Appellants improperly use a word
which is not in the paragraph of the contract which Appellants reference.
Appellants argue that the architect can stop work because of the "manner" of the
work. The paragraph to which Appellants refer indicates that the architect may
stop work to ensure the proper performance of the work, that the manner thereof.
j . The citations to the record here state that the Contractor shall not
subcontract with any Subcontractor who has been rejected by the owner, and
provides a mechanism for engaging subcontractors if the owner refuses to allow a
certain subcontractor to be on site. Deponents stated, during discovery, that the
retention of that right was so that if the owner was aware a certain contractor did
not perform in accordance with contract documents or was known to delay
performance, that subcontractor could be rejected. That does not give the owner
the right to interfere with the particulars of the work being performed by any
subcontractor who has not been refused. Thus, again, liability for work-place
injuries should not result to the owner.
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k. The reference of Appellants here state that, "the owner reserves the right
to perform work itself or to award other contracts in connection with other
portions of the project." That retention should not result in liability to the owner
where that right has not been exercised and the owner has not performed any
work, especially not any related to the injury at issue, nor interfered with the
particulars of the manner and methods of the work of others.
1. Appellants assert that the CPB installed its own carpet and pews. The
reference cited states, "on this project, I can't be for sure, but they typically install
their own pews, carpeting . . .". Evan's depo. at 81. Even if Appellants could
establish that the CPB installed its own pews and carpet, which Appellants have
not done, participating in some aspects of a project totally unrelated to the work
site injury does not subject the owner to liability.
m. The allegation by the Appellants here gives a different impression from
the contract. The contract states, "If a dispute arises among the contractor and
separate subcontractors as to the responsibility . . . for maintaining the project free
from waste materials and rubbish, the owner may clean up the project and allocate
the cost. . .". Such a right to quickly and expeditiously resolve disputes to keep a
project clean is a proper, logical right to be retained which should not result in
liability to the owner, especially where the accident had nothing to do with a
failure to clean up the project after a dispute in that regard arose among the
contractor and separate subcontractors.
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n. Change orders may issue. Change orders are a natural outgrowth of
construction. Partway through a project, an owner may decide to have a different
style of countertop or molding or an extra window or an upgrade of some type of
installation such as a sink or toilet, etc. The right to have changes made during the
project as long as the owner pays for such change orders should not subject the
owner to liability for the manner and methods by which work is accomplished on
the job. Such changes are not changes in or interference with the methods, manner
or means of performing the work.
o. The Contract, at the paragraph referenced by the Appellants, states that,
"in case of an emergency endangering life or threatening the safety of any person
or property, the contractor may, without waiting for specific authorization from
the architect or owner, act at its own discretion to safeguard persons and
property." This paragraph is a common sense paragraph to insure that whatever
needs to be done in an emergency to protect life and property, that can be done by
a contractor. That should not result in liability to an owner, and nor should that
imply that only in an emergency can a contractor act to protect life and property
without authorization from the owner to do so. The owner was not responsible for
safety on site. See R. at 259 para. 10.3. Also, under the facts of this case, any
emergency first occurred when the wall at issue started to tilt as it was being
raised, at that point the CPB had nothing to do with the project; his representsive
was not even there.
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p. Appellants state here that the CPB could select the materials used in the
construction. The contract provision here cited talks in terms of tests and
inspections and basically states that tests may be conducted to insure that materials
"meet Contract Document requirements/' Materials may be sampled and tested at
the owner's expense, again only to ensure that the materials conform to
specifications. Here again, the owner is just maintaining the right to control the
end product, not the manner, methods or means by which materials are installed or
work performed.
Lastly, without using a separate lettered paragraph, Appellants argue that a
variety of indemnification provisions allegedly exist citing specific references.
The following are the citations to the contract taken from page 44 of Appellants'
brief along with the text:
Contract paragraph 3.2c: "The Contractor shall be responsible to the
Owner for the acts and omissions of the Contractor's employees, Subcontractors
and their agents and employees,. . ."
3.13: "The Contractor shall defend and hold the Owner harmless from all
suits or claims for infringement of any patent or license rights or any laws on
account thereof."
3.14A: "The Contractor shall indemnify and hold harmless the Owner, the
Architect. . ., from and against any and all claims, . . . arising out of or resulting
from performance of the work, . . . but only to the extent caused in whole or in part
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by the negligent acts or omissions of the contractor and the subcontractor, in any
way directly or indirectly employed by them,. . .".
3.14B talks in terms of, "the Contractor shall be liable to defend the Owner
in any lawsuit filed by any subcontractor.
Sections 3.14C, D and E also provide that the Contractor will be
responsible to indemnify the owner.
Appellants impute unfounded reasons that the CPB included such
indemnification provisions in the Contract. For example, Appellants argue that
these provisions "were included because Appellee CPB . . . contemplated that
Appellee CPB would be liable for various acts and omissions committed by the
general contractor and subcontractors." Appellants' brief at 43. Appellants also
argue that, "if Appellee CPB truly believed and fully expected that it would incur
no liability because it had no control over the activities of the Appellee H&W and
that Appellee H&W was in fact an independent contractor, it would not have
inserted or agreed to the insertion of these indemnity provisions." Appellants'
brief at 44. See also similar argument at page 45 of Appellants' brief.
Such argument is unfounded. Even if the CPB felt that it could incur no
liability for work-place injuries if it did not interfere with the manner, means and
particulars of the work being performed which might result in injury, workers can
still attempt to sue, can still name an owner as a party, can still cause defense costs
to be incurred. This very lawsuit is a prime example. Although the CPB did not
retain or exercise control over the particulars of the work performed, and did not
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do anything else which might result in liability under the Thompson decision, yet
the CPB was named herein, was forced to go through lengthy depositions, has had
to prepare motions for summary judgment and now has had to prepare an appellate
brief, all of which occurred notwithstanding the clear statements of the Supreme
Court in Thompson which demonstrate a lack of liability on the part of the CPB,
and notwithstanding the fact that the CPB may feel it is in no way liable for the
very unfortunate injury in this case. This very lawsuit counters plaintiffs
argument. Notwithstanding how strongly a party may believe that they should not
and cannot be held liable, people may still sue. Therefore, provisions requiring a
general contractor to indemnify and hold an owner harmless are very rational,
effective provisions to protect the owner, and should not be used to imply that the
owner feels that the owner can and should be held liable.
In addition, all of the above rights retained by the CPB are those which the
Supreme Court in Thompson states are insufficient to result in liability. See quotes
from Thompson, at 18-19 of this brief.
POINT III
AN OWNER OF PROPERTY IS NOT VICARIOUSLY
LIABLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF ITS GENERAL
CONTRACTOR ON A CONSTRUCTION PROJECT.
Appellants argue that the co-Appellee, Hales & Warner Construction
Company was an employee of the CPB. Appellants' brief at 46-48. Appellants
argue that the Appellee CPB was an employer because it "retained and exercised
the right to choose those employees and subcontractors who would perform the
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work . . .'\ Appellants' brief at 47. Appellants further argue that the Appellee
CPB, "had the authority to hire and fire employees and subcontractors.
Appellants' brief at 47. Appellants argue that the CPB, "controlled, directed,
supervised or retained the right to control, direct or supervise the entity employed.
. .". Appellants' brief at 47-48. In so arguing, the Appellants cite a 1925 and a
1977 Utah Supreme Court case.
First, the CPB did not retain the right to choose employees of
subcontractors or of the general contractor, as Appellant's argue as will be
discussed below.
Second, the law with respect to a determination of whether a relationship is
that of independent contractor or employer/employee has been far more clearly
defined since 1977. In Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1996), the Supreme Court went into a lengthy recitation of the law concerning
independent contractor and employer/employee relationships. The court declared
that one of the basic factors for a determination is "whether the alleged employer
had the right to control the employee." Id. at 1385 citing Averett, 909 P.2d at 247.
The Court stated that the right of control concept is most frequently applied in the
Workers Compensation Act arena with respect to remedies available to an injured
party. The Court then went on to list factors in that context which have been held
determinative:
"In that context, we have identified several 'main facts' which are
helpful in determining whether an employer had the right to control
an alleged employee. Averett, 909 P.2d at 249. These factors
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include (i) whatever covenants or agreements exist concerning the
right of direction and control over the employee; (ii) the right to hire
and fire; (iii) the method of payment (i.e., wages v. payment for a
completed job or project); and (iv) the furnishing of equipment."
Id. at 1385-1386, citing Harry L. Young & Sons v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316, 318
(Utah 1995). The Court added some additional factors such as, "the intent of the
parties and the business of the employer, in addition to compensation, direction,
and control and that 4no single factor is completely controlling'." Id. at 1386
citing Gourdin, 845 P.2d at 244. The Court then noted that the right of control has
also been looked at in other contexts than workers compensation, such as, "under
the common law doctrine of respondeat superior." Id. at 1386 citing Foster v.
Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435, 432 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah 1967). The Court held that the
analysis under Foster, above, with respect to respondeat superior, was based on
the general analytical model of the workers compensation situation.
In analyzing Foster, the unanimous Supreme Court held that a franchisee
service station was not an employee of the franchisor, Texaco Corporation because
Texaco, "did not retain day to day control of the franchisee 'but, rather, merely
influenced the result to be achieved.9" Id. at 1386 citing Foster at 432 P.2d at 63.
(Emphasis added). In the case at bar, the CPB did not retain day to day control,
but only influenced the end result.
In analyzing Foster, the Court considered such factors as, "the station
[franchisee] paid its operating expenses . . . " and, "could hire and fire employees,
set its own hours of operation, and was not required to report to Texaco." Id. at
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1386. The above was true even though under the franchise agreement Texaco had
an "obligation to deliver products to the station [franchisee]". Id. at 1386.
If we look at the factors, mentioned above, such as control over the day to
day work, as opposed to merely influencing the result to be achieved, the method
of payment, that is, wages v. payment for a completed project, the furnishing of
equipment, etc. The relationship between the CPB and Hales & Warner was
clearly that of the owner and independent contractor, not employer/employee.
Under the contract, the contractor has the following duties which clearly
establish him as an independent contractor:
"Contractor shall furnish all of the materials and equipment and
perform all of the labor necessary to complete all of the work . . . "
Facts, above, paragraph 7.
"The Contractor shall supervise and direct the work . . . the
Contractor shall be solely responsible for all construction means,
methods, techniques, sequences and procedures . . .".
Facts, above, paragraph 8.
"Contractor is fully responsible for the project and all materials and
work connected therewith . . .".
Facts, above, paragraph 9.
"Unless otherwise provided in the Contract Documents, the
Contractor shall provide and pay for all labor materials, equipment,
tools, water, heat, utilities, transportation and other facilities and
services necessary for proper execution and completion of the
Work."
Facts, above, paragraph 10.
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"The intent of the Contract Documents is to include all labor,
material, equipment and other items necessary for the proper
execution and completion of the work.
Facts, above, paragraph 12.
"The Contractor's responsibility of the work includes the work and
materials of all subcontractors ...".
Facts, above, paragraph 17. All of the above indicate that this was not a case of
the CPB hiring someone for wages, but hiring an entity to provide all necessary
material, labor, etc. to complete an entire project. The general contractor was
clearly an independent contractor.
Appellants assert that the CPB had the right to hire and fire "subcontractors
and employees." See the quotes at the beginning of this Point. That is not correct.
The CPB retained the right to refuse to allow a subcontractor to do work on the
project. See Point II, above, at 26, paragraph j . The contract provides that, "the
Contractor shall not contract with any Subcontractor who has been rejected by the
Owner." The contract says nothing about the right of the CPB to hire and fire
employees of any subcontractor or any employees of the general contractor, as
asserted by Appellants. The only right which was retained by the CPB was to
reject a specific subcontractor in total.
What was additionally retained was only the ability to inspect the project
periodically to insure that the work completed conformed to specifications. For
example, the owner's representative onsite, the architect, "will make frequent
visits to the site to familiarize itself generally with the progress and quality of the
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work and determine if the work is proceeding in accordance with the Contract
Documents." Facts, above, paragraph 15. The architect, "is not required to make
exhaustive or continuous onsite inspections". Facts, above, paragraph 15. The
architect will only, "endeavor to guard the owner against defects and deficiencies
in the work." Facts, above, paragraph 15. The Contract goes on to state that:
"the Architect's review of submittals shall be for the limited
purpose of checking for general conformance with the
Contract Documents and shall not be conducted for purposes
of determining the accuracy and completeness of details such
as dimensions and quantities or for substantiating instruction
for installation or performance of equipment or a system all
of which remain the responsibility of the contractor."
Facts, above, paragraph 16.
The CPB only had one representative periodically associated with the
project. Facts, above, paragraph 19. He only visited the project once every two or
three weeks. Facts, above, paragraph 20. His visits were only to insure that the
building would be built according to plans and specifications. Facts, above,
paragraph 21. He did not control or interfere with the day to day details, methods,
manner or techniques that were used by the subcontractors, nor did he control or
interfere with safety of workers on the job site. Facts, above, paragraph 23.
From the above, it is clear that the relationship between the owner and the
general contractor was that of independent contractor and not that of
employer/employee. Therefore the CPB would not be vicariously liable for the
acts of the general contractor, Hales & Warner even if, somehow, Hales & Warner
could be held liable.
36

POINT IV
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE CPB RETAINED
OR EXERCISED CONTROL OVER THE MANNER,
METHODS, OPERATIVE DETAIL OR PARTICULARS
OF PERFORMANCE OF EVEN THE GENERAL TYPE OF
ACTIVITIES, PART OF WHICH CAUSED THE INJURY
The lower court could find no evidence that the CPB retained or exercised
control over the manner, methods, operative details or particulars of performance
of the general work which caused the injury, either retained, or exercised, or of
the precise activity which the injured party was performing at the time of the
injury. The lower court found no evidence that the CPB: (1) hired, trained or
educated the injured party or his co-workers; (2) directed, supervised, instructed or
controlled the decedent or his co-workers; (3) exerted control over the means
utilized by the decedent or his co-workers in doing the work which resulted in the
injury; (4) controlled the means utilized or the manner of performance of the work
being performed by the decedent at the time of injury; or (5) instructed the
decedent or his co-employees or their employer to perform work in a different
manner or by way of a different method. See FACTS, above, paragraph 24.
In addition, the lower court found that Egbert Construction was controlling
the means utilized and the manner of performance of the work being performed by
the decedent and his co-workers. See FACTS, above, paragraph 24 d. In addition,
no employee or representative of the CPB was even on site at the time of the
accident, nor had any involvement whatsoever in the work being performed by the
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decedent and his co-workers at the time of the accident. See FACTS, above,
paragraph 24 i.
Although the Appellants state that the only issue with respect to the CPB is
whether or not the CPB retained sufficient control by contract "without respect of
whether such contractual rights were in fact exercised" (See POINT II, above), the
Appellee CPB has scoured plaintiffs brief to see if there are any allegations of the
Appellants that the CPB exercised any control. The only facts relating to the CPB
mentioned by the Appellants in their brief other than those in Point II, above, did
not establish the exercise of control over the manner, method, operative detail or
particulars of performance of the work generally or specifically which resulted in
the accident at issue. The following are the only statements the CPB could find
with respect to its participation of the CPB, as opposed to passive nonparticipation.
Appellants state that, "the Appellee CPB along with Paul Evans, the
architect whom the Appellee CPB hired to assist it, reviewed the list [of
subcontractors] and approved of each contractor". Appellants' brief at 9. Even if
that occurred, approving a subcontractor generally is not active participation in the
manner, means, method, operative detail or particulars of performance of the
activities of those subcontractors during construction. In addition, it is interesting
to note that the allegation is that the CPB approved the subcontractor on a list.
However, the original subcontractor for framing was BRC, which hired Egbert
Construction Company, as a subcontractor, whose employee was the injured
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employee. See Appellants' Brief at 9. Egbert Construction was not on a list the
CPB may have seen.
Appellants assert that the CPB, "did not object or disapprove of the use of
Egbert Construction," as the contractor. Appellants' brief at 10. Again, failure to
object or disapprove of the use of a specific subcontractor, even if CPB was aware
of its existence, was not "active participation" in the means or methods used by
Egbert Construction, as required by the Supreme Court to create liability.
The Appellants allege that the CPB's architect instructed the general
contractor, "to tell the framers to build the wall to a specified height." Appellants'
Brief at 13. First, no reference to the architect telling the framers to build a wall to
a specified height could be found at the citation mentioned in Appellants1 brief.
Appellants' brief at 13, para. M. Appellants' citation to the instructions by the
architect with respect to the height of the wall is Exhibit 6, deposition page 46
which says nothing on that subject. Exhibit 6, paragraph 49 does indicate that the
first wall built by the subcontractor was "too tall," but that was called to the
deponent's attention by a person named Arlice, not the architect Paul Evans.
Exhibit 6, page 49.
Second, instructions as to a lower height of a wall are instructions as to the
desired result which the Supreme Court specifically stated was insufficient to
establish duty and liability. See the quote from the Utah Supreme Court that, "this
amounted merely to control over the desired result which is insufficient to come
within the retained control doctrine." See above, at page 18.
39

The Appellants allege that the architect, "was aware of H&W's [the general
contractor's] interference into the framing process, which he reported to CPB."
Appellants' brief at 14, para. o. First, there is no indication in the pages of the
depositions cited by Appellants that the architect reported to the CPB any alleged
interference with the framing process by the general contractor. The citation there
is to the deposition of the architect Evans, (Appellants' exhibit 8, at pages 63-72),
and that reference does not contain any indication that alleged interference with
the framing was reported to the CPB. The only reference to the CPB in those
pages is that the architect would review daily reports from the general contractor.
He reviewed those for, "general progress of the project and if there were
problems." Appellants' brief, Exhibit 8, page 63. The architect would make a
report to Mr. Schick of the CPB, as to "progress on" the project, not any alleged
interference with the framing process. Id. Thus, the CPB was aware of general
progress on the building via the architect, and Appellants' allegation is incorrect
and unreliable.
The Appellants state that Dean Schick, employee of the CPB, "stated that
nothing was installed incorrectly on the project", citing his deposition at page 24.
Appellants' brief at 14, para. p. Observing the finished product after a contractor
or subcontractor has used whatever means or methods they might choose to erect
something, to ensure it is proper, does not constitute interference with those means
and methods of installation. Observing that a final installation is correct, after the
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fact, is not interference with the means, methods and details of the manner of
performance of the work, therefore, that does not result in liability.
No other references or claims could be found as to alleged activities of the CPB,
and those mentioned do not establish duty or liability. Appellant has failed to establish
any activities which would result in liability, after a full discovery.
CONCLUSION
The district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the CPB should
be affirmed.
Dated this o__ day of April, 2004.
KIRTONA-McCONKIE

Robert R. Wallace
Attorney for Appellees

41

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
J hereby certify that on this GJP_ day of April, 2004 a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set
out below their name, by depositing a true and correct copy of said document in a
properly addressed envelope, postage prepaid to the following
Eric K. Davenport
Smith & Glauser
7351 South Union Park Avenue, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84047
Joseph Minnock
Morgan, Meyer & Rice
136 South Main, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Edward P. Moriarity
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Moriarity, Gooch & Badaruddin, LLC
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